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This study sought to determine if the Time magazine's coverage of 
the Nigerian Civil War was balanced and fair to both parties-the Federal 
government of Nigeria and the Biafra government. The writer is from 
Nigeria, was concerned with the coverage received by the Federal govern-
ment during the Civil War. He was concerned that the case of the 
· Federal government was not adequately presented by the Western press, 
the chief among which is the Time magazine. 
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ciation for the guidance and support given to me by my graduate work 
adviser and the Director of Graduate Studies of the School of Journalism 
and Broadcasting at Oklahoma State University, Dr. Walter J. Ward. It 
was his assistance, more than anything else, that provided my continuing 
course of study. 
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This is not a study of the Nigerian Civil War itself, but of how 
the civil war was portrayed by the Time magazine. The writer believes 
a brief chronological description of events that led to the civil war 
would provide an adequate back.ground for those unfamiliar with Nigeria. 
This back.ground was best summarized by Lloyd when he wrote: 
The Nigerian Civil War was between the Regions and over the 
right of one of them to secede from the Federations But the 
impetus for the war and its prolongation derived from the 
hostility which had developed between the major ethnic 
groups of the country. 1 
The dominant ethnic groups are Hausa (approximately 15 million), 
Ibo (approximately 10 million) and Yoruba (approximately 10 million). 
The river Niger forms the natural boundaries between these major groups 
- Hausa to the north, Yoruba to the south, and Ibo to the east (see 
Figure 1). These three major groups have other minor tribes within 
their boundaries. 
If the beginning of the civil war was the climax of the events 
that happended between January, 1966 and May, 1967 (a brief description 
of these events will follow later), the situation before 1966 was the 
gathering of the storm for what happened on the night of January 14-15, 
1966. Panter-Brick put it thus: 
1P. L Lloyd, "The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis, 11 In 
Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War (London, 
1970), p. 11. 
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The muted confrontation between the President and the Federa~ 
Prime Minister, arising out of the 196~ Federal election, was 
a portent of the gathering storm. The rigged elections in the 
Western Region in October 1965, and the resulting breakdown of 
law and order in that Region, were clearly the prelude to fur-
ther, more desperate, measures involving in all probability. 
the use of the army. Rumors to this effect were rife when, 
in the night of 14:-15 January 1966, a small group of army 
officers staged a coup, murdering in the process several lead-
ing politicians and senior military officers. 2 
·After the military coup on the night of ,January 14:-15, 1966, one 
event led to another at very close paces. This culminated in the civil 
war. These are the major events that had direct effects on the nature 
of the civil war. 
On January 16, 1966, General Ironsi, an Ibo, assumed power as Head 
of the Federal Military Government. He appointed military governors to 
administer the Regions. In May, he formally abolished the Regions and 
the Federation (see Figure 2). 
The reaction was swift in the North. There were riots and massacre 
of Ibo civilians presumably by the Hausa populace. And in the West, 
Northern troops mutinied. General Ironsi, Colonel Fajuyi, and some one-
hundred Ibo officers and men were killed. 
On August 1, Lt. Col. Gowon, a northerner, took over as Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces and Head of the National Military Govern-
ment. Lt. Col. Ojukwu, who later became the leader of Biafra, refused 
to recognize him~ 
Between Augustiand April, several futile attempts were made to re-
solve the crisis peacefully. On April 1, 1967, Lt. Col. Ojuk.wu confis-
cated federal go.vernment revenues. This was followE;d by similar 
2s. K. Panter-Brick, "Military Coup To Civil War January 1966 To . 
May 1967, 11 : In Nig~rian Politics ~ Military Rule: Prelude to. the Civil 
War (London, 1970), p. 16. 
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Figure 2. Map of Nigeria Showing the Old 
Structure of Four Regions and 
Major Tribal Groups 
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measures and retaliatory action by the Federal Military Government. 
A meeting of the Eastern Region's Consultative Assembly was held 
May 26 1 27. Lt. Col. Ojukwu was authorized to secede. On that same 
dar, Lt. Col. Gowan declared a state of emergency, assumed fu11· powers, 
and divided Nigeria into twelve states (see Figure J). Finally, on May 
JO, the Eastern Region seceded from the Federation and declared the area 
covered by the Eastern Region the "Republic of Biafra" (see Figure l.i:). 
This final act led the Federal authority to launch war, at this stage 
was called "police action," against Biafra to bring it back into the 
folq. 
The purpose of this study, as previously stated, is to examine the 
performance of Time magazine during the events that took place in 
Nigeria in the 18 months that followed. And that event, as it is now 
known, is the Nigerian Civil War. 
Many questions about communications are asked non-quantit~tively, 
as in this case:· 
Did the Time magazine deal fairly with the Federal government in 
its coverage of the Nigerian Civil War?J 
The need to carry out this study arose from the generally expressed 
opinion among many Nigerians both at home and abroad in their attempts 
to answer the question raised above. Most Nigeria~s, who the writer 
spoke with, hold a very strong view that the Time's coverage of the war 
was slanted in favor of the rebeis. 
This is a question of fact which is amenable to.content analysis: 
What is the actual distribution of favorable, unfavorable, and neutral 
3Harold D •. Laswe],l,. VThe. Comparative Study of Symbols, 11 Hoover 
I:nstitute·Studies,, Series C 9 No. 1 (1952), p. 10. 
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items in the body of stories on the war published by Time? 
There is a statistic, the knowledge of which would help in 
answering the question raised above. As Lasswell once conjectured, 11 Is 
there any statistic on the content of this communication which, if 
obtainable, will help solve my research problem? 11 4: 
8 
It is the opinion of the writer that this question can be answered 
in the affirmative in the present study. 
Why did the nigerians feel this way about the coverage of the war 
.--::;., 
by one of America I s internationally circulated news magazine.? The 
answer to this can be found in an incident that happened early in the 
war. 
Bruce Oudes, who covered Nigerian developments fdr several American 
publications, was expelled from Nigeria by the·Federal Military Govern-
ment in La.gos. 5 From this point on, the only news of the conflict that 
reached the American public came solely from the rebel side. And the 
major part of it originated from Time correspondents. 
Before his departure~ he managed to write the following in one of 
his dispatches: 
From the military standpoint~ it was clear that newsmen. 
were, and are, viewed as a special burden to be dealt with in 
an efficient, military fashion - only periodically and all in 
one group. Some officers had a special reason for wanting 
newsmen out of their hair and preventing them from turning up 
at unexpected moments! They were deeply involved in black-
market operation.6 
Added to this was the generally pro-Biafra sentiments held in the 
4:Ibid., p. 12. 
5Genenka Zdenek, The Nigerian War (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1972), p. 52. 
6Ibid., p. 52. 
9 
country. In January, 1969, President Nixon ordered a study of U.S. 
relief operations and asked Donald E. Lukens, who had just returned from 
his.visit to both Biafra and Nigeria, to report his findings. Needless 
to say, this was also pro-Biafra. 
When asked by the press whether the new administration was con-
templating radical changes in the U.S. policy of supporting "one 
Nigeria," he said: 
••• I do think Biafra has the usual right to be heard 
before appropriate international bodies, including the United 
Nations. And I think it is wrong to base a policy on colonial 
boundaries drawn decades ago by colonial powers to serve 
European interests.7 
Apart from this official stance, which was very pro-rebel, the 
prolongation of the war and the reports of starvation and suffering 
among the civilian population in the besieged Biafra received wide 
publicity in the United States. 8 
This follows the simple fact that newspapers and newspapermen 
inevitably play an important role in every international dispute; and 
more important the conflict of interest, the more vital the influences 
f . 1· 9 o Journa ism. 
Obviously, the influence of the press on any great international 
question is quite as uneven as individual temperaments, prejudice and 
ideals. Sometimes the press does a good job and sometimes it does 
10 
nothing but throw oil on the flames. 
7Ibid., p. 125. 
8Ibid., p. 124,. 
9Leland Stowe, ''The Press and International Friction," Journalism 
Quarterly, Vol. 13 (March, 19j6), p. 1. 
10Ibid., p. 2. 
10 
All these are impressionistic "more or less" judgments of "either 
or. 11 Hence, the writer's attempt to subject what was written on the 
war by one of the American internationally recognized news magazines to 
content analysis - the characteristic of which Lasswell explained thus: 
It is a quantitative aspect. Content analysis aims at 
a classification of content in more precise, numerical terms 
than is provided by the impressionistic. It prov.ides a pre-
cise meaning of describing the contents of any sort of com-
munications -- newspapers, radio programs, films, everyday 
conversations, verbalized free association, etc. The opera-
tions of content analysis consist of classifying the signs 
occurring in a communication into a set of appropriate cate-
gories. The results state the frequency of occurrence of 
signs for each category in the classification scheme. 11 
There are special considerations of feasibility favoring use of 
the national news magazines, rather than other media. The flow of 
symbols in fiim and radio have less regularity in sequence. News maga-
zines appear regularly and frequently in uniform formats. They are 
mainly an information medium rather than entertainment. Also, they 
have a more or less explicit point of view. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to make a symbol analysis of 
TIME coverage. 
In a sense, content analysis occurs whenever someone summarizes 
and/or interprets what he reads or hears. As Berelson contended: 
Content analysis denotes an objective, systematic, and 
quantitative method for the analysis of communication content, 
intended to provide precise and concise description of wQat 
the communication says, in terms appropriate to the purpose. 
at hand.12 
Hence, this study is an attempt: 
~~H~rold D. Lasswell, "Studies in Quantitative Semantics," Language 
of Politics.(New. York, 194:9), P• 55. 
12Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research 







To state a symbol list which would index the hypothesis. 
To analyze the flow of symbols throughout the period of 
the war in all the issues of the magazines published 
throughout the period of the.£~\iar. 
To count for distribution of favorable and unfavorable 
symbols in relation to the Federal Government. 
To find out the relationship of the distribution of both 
favorable and unfavorable symbols in the light of the 
performance of the participants during various phases of 
_p,r. 
To look at the words that are there, instead of guessing 
at their meanings. 13 
11 
Thus, this study examines through ex-post facto study, the bias of 
a communication medium through content analysis of the message, and 
thereby, using the flow of words as an expression of attitude. 
13Ibid., p. 29 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Since the 19J0 1 s through the post-war years, a large body of 
literature on, and as a result of, content analysis has been published. 
Some of these studies pertain to studying the flow of foreign news into 
the United States or to other countries. 1 
For example, while James W. Markham made a comparative study of 
foreign news in the dailies of the United States and South America, 2 
Abu Lughold made a similar study of International news in Arabic press.3 
Many of these studies employed the traditional methods of content 
analysis such as: 
Space occupied, length of column, colum~ width of text and 
headlines; page location; size oiheadline type; type face, 
style, roman, boldface, italics, capitals; number of lines 
in headlines - blanks, cross lines; use of accompanying maps, 
pictures, and cartoons; use of colons; use of lead ta space 
texts - lines; use of boxes around stories on leads. 
All of the above methods were useful to the researchers in 
1Sharif Mujahid, "Coverage of Pakistan in Three U.S. Newsmaga-
zines, 11 Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 1±7, No. 1 (Spring, 1970), p. 50. 
2James W. Markham, A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Newspapers of 
United States and South America (University Park, Pa., 1959). 
3Abu-Lughod Ibrhim, "International News in Arabic Press; A 
Comparative Content Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 26 
(Winter, 1962), p. 6000-6012. 
4,D. Milton Stewart, "Importance in Content Analysis," Journalism 
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December, 191±3), pp. 286-287. 
12 
13 
providing them with qualitative data about the content of communication. 
Janis expressed a view on the subject which demonstrated the lack 
of quantification in the prevailing techniques. He wrote: 
•Content analysis' may be defined as referring to any 
technique a) For classification of the sign - vehicles; b) 
Which relies solely upon the judgments (which theoretically, 
may range from percentile discrimination to sheer guess) of 
an analysis or group of analysts as to which sign - vehicles 
fall into which categories; c) On the bases of explicitly 
formulated rules; d) Provided t~at the analyst's judgmegts 
are regarded as the repor~s of a scientific observation. 
The science of content analysis underwent a traumatic change 
immediately after World War II. The reason for this is closely related 
to the adroit usage of propaganda disguised as communication by Nazi 
Germany during the War. 
I.n the early post-World War II years, Hoover Institute and Library 
on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University sponsored its 
first study of - The RADIR Studies, "The Study of International Symbols." , 
This study suggests the wide possibilities of content analysis for 
solving problems. Such important factors in international relations in 
the rate of socia.l change' in the general tension level is opinion about 
key symbols and policies and in identification with groups and with 
national and international symbols may be closely paralleled by measure-
t . d' 6 men in ices. 
The subsequent report suggests that measurement of the intensity 
of opinion about key symbols may provide an index of general t~sion 
5 I. L. Janis, "Meaning and Study of Symbolics Behaviors, 11 
Psychiatry, Vol. 6, No. 1 (i943), PP• 425-436. 
6Quincy Wright, "Introduction to Symbols of Internationalism," 
Hoover Institute Studies.Series c, No. J (Stanford, California, 1951), 
p. J. 
level. Changes in attention to key symbols may provide an adequate 
index of social change. 7 
According to Lasswell, one of the experts involved in the Hoover 
Institute Studies: 
What most students who speak of vsymbols 1 (a technical 
term for words) have in common is an interest in a flow of 
words as an expression of attitude. Words are 'symbols' 
because they stand for (symbolize) the attitudes of those who 
use them, as distinguished, for example, from 'signs,' which 
are words that point to (signalize) objects external to their 
users. The symbol analyst works with words by selecting 
those which best stand for the attitudes - whose presence or 
absence he wishes to detect and describe. Symbols thus con-
ceived serve as his 1operational indices 1 of attitude.a 
It may be true that "actions speak louder than words" and it is 
certainly true that people who use symbols of communication often 
neither mean what they say nor say what they mean. 
Pool wrote: 
Symbol usage is basic.ally the link between means and ends, 
promise and fulfillment. They also very often serve a rit-
ualistic end. Familiar symbols heard or read in a familiar 
context often induce a sense of security (or insecurity) even 
in those who 1 haven 1 t the foggiest idea' of what the symbols . 
mean.9 
14 
Concerning the meaning and the study of symbolic behaviors through 
the use of content analysis, Janis, on "semantic content analysis," 
agrees. This, according.to him, deals with the relations between signs 
and their significations. The procedure sets up classification rules in 
terms of common significations. 
?Ibid., P• 4. 
8 H. D. Lasswell, "The Analysis of Symbolic Content 1 11 The Compara-
tive Study of Symbols (Stanford, California 1 1952), p. 29.~-
9Peter H. Odegard, in "Introduction t0 Symbols of Democracy," 
Hoover Institute Studies, Series C, No. 1 (Stanford, California, 
1952). 
Two major types of •semantic content analysis' may be 
distinguished: designation analysls and assertion analysis. 
Designation analysis consists in counting terms which signify 
a given designation, that is, roughly speaking, signs which 
refer to the same thing. Thus, for example, the sign-vehicles 
•Hitler,,· •Nazi, 1 1Reichs, 1 and •Berlin' might be classified, 
when they occur in certain contexts, as falling into the 
designation category 'reference to Germany.' 
· Asse~tion analysis: This goes one step beyond designation 
analysis. It describes what is designated but it also de-
scribes how the designated object is characterized. The unit 
of analysis is assertion; any phrases which contain an iden-
tifior and a characterizor, and which connects the two in 
accordance with syntactical rules of language. 10 
Janis contended that, irrespective of the counting unit which is 
used in these assertion analyses, the meaning unit remains a phrase 
· which connects a characterizor with a identifior. Thus, even though 
the analyst reports frequencies in terms of numbers of paragraphs or 
number of articles, the determinants of the classification of these 
counting units are assertions which occur in the paragraph or.in the 
t . l 11 ar ice. 
15 
Lasswell listed the conditions that should be fulfilled by content 
analysis of communication: 
It should enable the investigator to determine relationship 
between a given (content) characteristic of communications 
and a) characteristic of communication 7 b) characteristic of 
the audience, or c) some other (content and non-content) 
character~stic of the communication. 12 
He then suggested the types of hypotheses that can be tested with 
content analysis. These are: 
1. Propositions which state a relationship between (a) a 
10J . anis, pp. L.i:30-L.i:31. 
11Ibid. 7 p, l.i:31. 
12 Lasswell, Language of Politics, p. L.i:o. 
communicator's environment, his opposition in the social 
structure, his personality traits~ or his intentions, and 
(b) the kinds of signs which occur in his communications. 
2. Propositions which state a relationship between (a) the 
kinds of signs which occur in communication, and (b) the 
reactions of audience (such as changes in attitudes) which 
result from perceiving those signs. 
J. Propositions which state a relationship between one kind 
of sign in communications and another kind of sign which 
occurs in the same communication, such as typography. 13 
This study is concerned only with the relationships between 
16 
the kind of signs or symbols used by Time magazine in its coverage of 
the Nigerian Civil War? but not with the reactions of audience (such as 
changes in attitudes) which result from perceiving those signs. 
The writer would also like to point out that the typography of 
such.signs or symbols are of no importance to the present study because 
of the format of Time magazine - it does not use banner headlines or 
special type faces for emphasis. 
Recent Attempts at Quantification 
o.f Content Analysis 
It is the writer's opinion that the review of quantitative content 
analysis of communication media would be incomplete without a word on 
Edith Efron's analysis of television bias. 
Whittaker Chambers before her? who produced his Pumkin Papers, 
which in a sense quantified his argument on the nature of the Soviet 
threat that sent Hiss to jail, demonstrates the importance of 
t ' f' t' 14: quan 1 1ca ion. 
The lack of quantification of Vice President Spiro Agnew's case 
17 
against. the TV networks did not make him credible outside his so called 
t.1silent majority." 
Hence, Efron turned quality into quantity by assertion count and 
breaking everything into simple "fors" and "againsts" of network news 
in relation to the Nixon Administration. 15 
The technique of Efron has been criticized for three basic 
shortcomings: 
(1) The categories are not all inclusive. 
(2) The categories are not usually exclusive. 
(3) No rules are used for fgentifying materials to be 
coded, or how to code. 
These criticisms would act as guidelines for the investigator in 
this study. 
Other Approaches to Content Analysis 
Another way of looking at content analysis is the mode of the 
communication. George distinguished two models; the representational : 
14-John Chamberlain, "Edith Efren's Murderous Adding Ma.chine," 
National Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 43 (November 5, 1971, P• 1225. 
15Ibid. 
16Robert L. Stevenson, "Untwisting the News Twisters - A Republican 
of Efron's Study," Journalism Quarterli, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1973), P• 212. 
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model and the instrumental model. 17 The serious questions raised by 
this approach is that of inferences that can be made about the rela-
tionship between a message and its antecedent motives or causes. 
He argued that the purposes for which messages are designed deter-
mine the meaning that can be assigned to ~ecific words. According to 
him, rather than represent an author's true feelings (the representa-
tional model), many messages are purposely biased so as to manipulate 
an audience in a prede';'ignated way (instrumental model). 18 
Mitchell, as reported by Stempel, supports this view: 
Messages filter through a number of gates, and some of 
these gates neutralize or exaggerate the effects produced 
at other phases in the communication process. According to 
these models, one must view messages as only indirect indi-
cators of the underlying variables being studied. 19 
The Question of Reliability of Content Analysis 
The diverse approaches to content analysis are not the only area of 
disagreement. What about the reliability? 
Very little has been written on this. Stempel views reliability 
in content analysis as a problem that individual researchers must solve 
to his own satisfaction within the limits of his study, design and 
20 
resources. 
He defined reliability as consistency of measurement. These errors 
17George L. Alexander, Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, Illinois, 
1959), P• 200. 
18Robert Mitchell, "The Use of Content Analysis for Exploratory 
Studies, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 3 (Fall, 1967), p. 237. 
19H. Guido Stempel III, "Increasing Reliability in Content 
Analysis," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. ft (Fall, 1955), p. 10. 
20Ibid. 
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of reliability he said are random errors rather than content. 
Lasswell is very much in agreement with Stempel: on this. 
In the case of sign-vehicle with respect to validation, 
because such techniques provide a direct measure. of physical 
occurrences, the analyst's operations involve simply percep-
tional discriminations: determining the presence or absence 
of a given physical configuration and counting the number 
which are present. Hence, no special validation procedures 
are necessary. 22 
Janis holds a very strong view as to how important the problem 
of reliability is in content analysis. 
Content analysis, like those obtained from any quantita-
tive technique, must be evaluated in terms of the reliability 
of the method of analysis. It is obvious that the frequences 
obtained by a content analysis would be without significance 
if different analysts di'd not agree in their classif.i.cation of 
symbol data. The degree to which there is disagreement among 
analysts determines the amount of •error of measurement. 123 
If this error of measurement is a random error, as stated by 
Stempel, one need not be unduly concerned about it. 
Furthermore, Janis gave guidance as to how these errors could be 
avoided. He indicated that reliability is a function of (a) the pre-
19 
cision with which the rules of content analysis(i.e., definition of the 
categories) are set up and (b) the ease with which discrimination can 
be made between the types of content specified by the rules. 
21Ibid. 
22 Laswell, Language of Politics. 
23 Irving L. Janis, "The Reliability of a Content Analysis Tech-
nique," The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1943), p. 243. 
CHAPTER III 
DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
The investigator attempted to determine, through content analysis 9 
the relation between several characteristics of symbols used by Time 
magazine in its coverage of the Nigerian Civil War. 
The symbols employed were chosen from Lasswell: 
There is no cut-and-dried list of political symbols (and 
objects) that will serve the needs of every research on 
politically significant contents of the press. We can, 
however, be sure that comprehensive studies will include 
certain classes of symbols: 
1. of persons 
2. of groups 
.3. of agencies 
'*· of policies 
5. of participants 
6. of ideas (statements of crimes, future 
expectations ).1 
The questions posed were: Did Time magazine use some symbols 
concerning the rebel in favorable light while the same group of symbols 
were used concerning the Federal government in unfavorable light? What 
kind of attention was given to the participants in the Civil War? How 
often did the news magazine refer to the participants or the issues? 
And in what direction - favorable or unfavorable? And what dimension -
moral or immoral, strength or weakness? 
1 Harold D. Lasswell 9 "The Politically Significant Content of the 
Press, Coding Procedures," Journalism Quarterly (March 19, 191±2), p. 12. 
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Operational Definition of Variables 
(1) The Rebel government and its leadershiE: Any reference to the 
Republic of Biafra, Biafrans and Lt. Col. Ojuk.wu, and other representa-
tives of his government. 
(2) !h!, Fede·ral government and lli leadershie: Any reference 
to the Federal government of Nigeria, Nigerians and Lt. Col. Gowan and 
other representatives of his government. 
(3) Favorable: Any reference to the parties in the conflict in 
positive li°ght as defined earlier in the potential value of the symbol. 
This is in relation to our two classes: strength and morality - cause 
(or effect) and conformity or non-conformity of a symbol to a norm 
(the norm being the usual usage to that symbol). 
(~) Unfavorable: Any reference to the parties in the conflict 
in negative light, also as defined in the potential value of the symbol 
usage. This again is in relation to our two classes: strength and 
morality - cause (or effect) and conformity of a symbol to a norm (the 
being the usual usage of that symbol. 
(5) The issues at stake in the civil war: This is a deduction 
made by the writer from the opinion expressed by the parties in the 
conflict, United Nigeria and secession. As Major General Yakubu Gowon 
put it in one of his interviews, 11 1 am fighting a war to keep the coun~ 
try one and united." It should be noted that the conflict ended when 
Biafra leaders formally renounced secession in these words: 11We are 
loyal Nigerian citizens, and we accept the authority of the Federal 
Mi 1 i tary government • 11 
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Statement of the Problem 
The writer is concerned with the objectivity of Time magazine's 
coverage of the Nigerian Civil War. 
The following questions were asked during the study of the stories 
of the conflict published by Time. 
Which aspect of rebel 1 s story did Time emphasize? Was it their 
successes or failures? 
In what light did Time portray the two sides? 
In what dimension was the Federal government portrayed in Time 
coverage of the civil war? 
To which did Time direct more attention, was it the issues or the 
major participants in the conflict? 
Key Symbols Studied 
As Berelson pointed out: A value judgment must be made in connec-
tion with standard. One of the ways in which standard for measuring 
/ performance may be set is a master list constructed by the analyst of 
2 
major facts of the events. This is what the investigator did. The 
following key symbols tell the story of the war. 
The treatment of subjects was measured on the following variables 
or key symbols: 
2 B. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research 
(Illinois, 1952). 
1. Genocide 18. Onitsha 35. Petrol - oil 
2. Starvation 19. Republic of Benin 36. Ammunition 
3· Hunger 20. .Ore 37. U. K. 
4:. Biafra 21. Owerri 38. France 
5. Gowan 22. Uli 39. U. S. A. 
·6. Ojukwu 23. Umuahia 4:0. Hospital 
7. Red Cross 24:. United Nigeria 4:1. Church 
8. Christian 25. Minari ty 42. Market 
9. Muslim 26. Coup 43. Secession 
10. dne Nigeria 27. Rebel 44. Mercenaries 
11. IBO 28. Soviet 45. Blockades 
12. Women 29. Rolf Stener 46. Relief 
13. Children JO. Col. Adekunle 47. Massacre 
14. Hausa 31. Lagos 48. Survival 
15. Yoruba 32. O.A •. U. 49. Sovereignty 
16. Catholic 33. Kwashiokor 50. Radio Lagos. 
17. Enugun J4. Police Action 
The adequacy of such symbols is as stated by Lasswell in his com~ 
parative study of symbols as: 
As means of surveying the significant features of a vast body 
of symbol material, it is convenient to focus upon key symbols 
occurring in the flow of political statements. The role of 
key symbols in political life is deeply woven into the texture 
of the body politic 1. since symbols enter into the experience 
of everyone 9 irrespective of status. Key symbols are focal 
points for crystallization of sentiment, unitini child with 
adult, layman with expert 1 philosopher with lawyer, the spec-
ulative man with the man of action.3 
The number of potential value standards if infinitely great. But 
3Lasswell, "The Comparative Study of Symbols," Hoover Institute 
Studies, p. 10. 
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for practical purposes, it is useful to concentrate on two broad 
classes: strength and morality. The former standard refers to the 
position of the symbol as a cause (or effect) of value changes. It 
includes military, diplomatic, economical, and ideological assets and 
effectiveness. The morality standard relates to conformity or non-
conformity of a symbol to a norm. Strictly, the word "morality" is too 
narrow, by definition. However, it includes the presentation of symbols 
in terms of beauty, goodness, c~nsistency and the like.~ 
The content analyst does not know what to expect. There is almost 
no theory of language which predicts the specific words one will emit 
in the course of expressing the content of his thoughts. Theories in 
philosophy or in sociology of knowledge sometimes enable us to predict 
ideas or social characteristics. But little thought has been given to 
predicting the specific words in which these ideas will be cloaked. 
As such, it is impossible for us to operate on specific hypothesis. 
However, one can offer the following research questions: 
(1) What proportion of Time's coverage was negative and 
,positive to the Federal government? The rebels? 
(2) Which of the two participants did Time magazine por-
tray in more unfavorable light than favorable? 
(J) How accurate was the Time's coverage of the war with 
regard to the aspect emphasized in its coverage? 
This study is based on historical records. This is because of the 
time lag between the event and the study of it. The investigator 
recognizes the difficulty that this "historical standard" will not be 
25 
so acceptable to all. Two historians working independently with the 
same sources might not construct a list that is "objective" in the sense 
that it can be duplicated by every historian working independently. 
In his searching study of pistorian accounts of the cause of the 
American Civil War, Beal commented that: 
Two authors of equal honesty, sincerity, and scholarly train-
ing, each believing he has been completely 1objectional,' may 
use the same historical material to arrive at diametrically 5 
opposed statements of what each believes is historic 'fact.' 
But, repeatability is not the only test of objectivity. In this 
historical standard, the. following are among the claims that have been 
made by historians and others: "First there are many clearly-established 
'facts' of history that are stable and stand as constants: date, name, 
and certain sets of official and unofficial persons and bodies. 116 
For example, historians would not quarrel over the date of crossing 
the river Niger into Biafra, although they may be in severe disagreement 
as to the cause or causes of the civil war. 
Hence, it is the opinion of the investigator that the list of key 
symbols would suffice for our purpose. 
Time Phases of Analysis 
The author attempted to analyze the content of Time magazine 
coverage of a specific event that took place during the period from July, 
1967 to January, 1970. As such, the data available are of limited 
nature. Unlike customary content analysis, the material investigated, 
5Howard K. Beale, "What Historians Have Said About the Causes 
of Civil War," Theory and Practice in Historical Study, ! Report of 





such as newspaper headlines or items on radio news programs, a count 
was made of their number during certain time intervals. If the mater-
ials investigated involve a large number of items, the procedure takes 
much time and labor. This suggests sampling of material as a labor-
saving device. 
Hence, the investigator decided not to employ a sampling technique 
but to read carefully through all the issues of the publication from 
July, 1967 to January, 1970. Occurrences were recorded as favorable, 
unfavorable, or neutral to two key symbols. 
As Pool put it, attitudes are ordinarily thought of as being 
di:;'~ctional - for or against. 7 
To identify the trend of events during the war, the period covered 
by this investigation has been grouped into five phases. Each phase 
represented favorable or unfavorable situations for one or both par-
ticipants in the conflict. 
1st Phase (July, 1967 - August, 1967) 
"Police action" against Biafra and invasion of Mid-West 
Region by Biafra forces. 
2nd Phase (August, 1967 - October, 1967) 
Full-scale military operations against Biafra. Fall of 
Enugun, Onitsha 7 Calarbar and Portharcourt. 
3rd Phase (October, 1968 - April 2 1969) 
Biafran counter-offensive in October, 1968. Escalation 
of raid by the Nigerian Air Force. 
7Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Symbol of Internationalism," Hoover 
Institute Studies, No. 3 (1951), p. 12. 
4th Phase (April, 1969 - November, 1969) 
The fall of Umuahia the surprising recovery of the 
Biafran forces in recapturing Owerri. The private war of 
Count Von Rosen. 
5th Phase: The Collapse of Biafra (November, 1969 - January, 1970) 
The 11 final-push 11 by the Federal forces and the capitulation 
of Biafra on January 12, 1970. 8 
Analysis of Symbols 
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Ex post facto research may be defined as that in which independent 
variables have already occurred and in which the researcher starts with 
observation of a dependent variable or variables. He then studies the 
independent variables in retrospect for their possible reactions to, and 
effects upon, the dependent variable or variables. 9 
As noted, what the investigator had to work with is purely the 
report of the war in Time magazine. Analyses involved the flow of 
symbols in a series of situations. Since a class of more than one 
member is involved, the method must count for distribution as well as 
reference of the symbols selected for study. To describe distribution, 
the analytic categories must be used according to certain statistical 
conventions. This is what is meant by quantification. 10 
8 Genenka Zdenek, The Nigerian War (Frankfurt-am-Main), 1971, 
P• 55° 
9Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundation of Behavioral Research (New York, 
1964), P• 55° 
10 Lasswell, ."The Comparative Study of Symbols," pp. 31-32. 
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The methodology of this study draws heavily on the work of 
Lasswell et al. 11 First, the content was read for descriptive purposes. 
The next step was to set up a stable base of comparison. 12 One method 
of constituting a stable base is to take that total number of frequen-
cies per period of a selected symbols list. Lasswell explained it 
thus: 
We do count meanings when we count frequencies of a given 
symbol, and obtain a meaningful base when we pool frequencies 
of all the symbols of our list. The assumption involved if 
we choose words, is that there is a constant relation between 
number of words and the universe of meaning conveyed by these 
words.13 
First, one must select the recording unit. This, according to 
Lasswell et al., is the range of text for which occurrence of a symbol 
1~ is tabulated with the unit weight of 1. This could either be a sym-
bol, a paragraph, three sentences or article. In this study, a symbol 
sufficed. 
Then the writer decided on the specified context. This is the 
range of text which is to be considered in characterizing the presen-
t t . f 1· t d b 1 · · d' ·t 15 a ion o a is .e sym o in any given recor ing uni • Hence, it is 
the portion of text to be read in order to determine whether a given 
symbol is favorable or unfavoraple. It could be a sentence, a para-
graph, three sentences or an article. For this study, the author 
11Harold D. Lasswell, "The Politically Significant Content of the 







employed the sentence. 
The point should be made here that the choice of unit depends upon 
the problem under investigation. With only 3~ stories published by 
.!!.!!!2. on the war, the investigator had to make the arbitrary decision to 
enable the detailed study of the flow of symbols. 11A small-unit record-
ing procedure," noted Lasswell, "would catch qualifying ideas that would 
elude a larger content method and diminish the strength of the reported 
b . 1116 ias. 
The next step is what frequency unit to employ. Lasswell suggested 
17 
an unweighted unit of reference which counts every occurrence. 
This study treated the symbol ~s favorable or unfavorable(+ or-). 
The underlying proposition, of course, was that responses are affected 
by the manner in which the symbol was presented. This, in turn, was 
affected by direction, intensity, and elaboration. 
Therefore, the need arose for special precaution to spell out 
criteria. 
We must adopt simple and reliable procedures if we are to 
advance the study of press content beyond simple impres-
sionism. If we use a word, we must clarify our meaning. 
In explaining how1~he terms favorable - unfavorable are 
to be understood. 
The work of Lasswell on attention to some democratic symbols 
provided a generally acceptable means of doing this. 




of the World Attention. 19 But it has been altered where necessary to 
suit the present study. 
(a) Any city is coded as its country. Example, OWERRI, code 
BIAFRA: LAGOS, code NIGERIA. 
(b) Any public figure (or synonym for him) is coded as his 
country unless he is in the symbol code. Example, AZIKWE 
code BIAFRA; HASSAN code NIGERIA. 
(c) Any synonym for a country is coded·as that country. 
Similarly, any synonym for a man is coded as the man. 
(d) Do not use pronouns as synonyms. However, there are 
certain instances where coding would be impossible unless 
this were done. Further, often the reference is abun-
dantly clear. For example, OJUKWU: 11WE FIGHT TO THE LAST 
MAN," Here, the WE obviously refers to BIAFRA. Without 
this substitution, it would be impossible to cide. OJUKWU, 
therefore, in the above example, codes BIAFRA for WE. 
(e) Intertwined Symbols - In cases like 110JUKWU 1 S BIAFRA 11 7 
"NIGERIAN Military Leader Gowan," where two symbols occur 
together, code for plus and minus only the symbols which 
are the subject or object of the verb. Symbols used 
adjectivetly should be counted as neutral. Examples, 
110JUKWU 1S BIAFRA is strong." Neutral for OJUKWU, and 
plus for BIAFRA. 
(f) Pronominal Reference - Although in general a pronoun gives 
an implicit reference to an explicit symbol in some 
JO 
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sentence, note that two conditions must be fulfilled: 
(1) · The reference must be abundantly clear; 
(2) The pronoun must not be merely incidental to the 
statement as a possessive pronoun frequently is in 
a prepositional phrase used in a merely adjectival 
way. 
The test is whether a definite or indefinite article could 
be substituted for the pronoun without obvious loss of 
meaning. Example, "In his review of the war situation, 
OJUKWU praised the heroism of the BIAFRA Army." Neutral 
for OJUKWU; plus for BIAFRA. 
(1) To strike the balance in comparison: Example, 11The 
BIAFRA lost 10 planes, the NIGERIANS lost 5 planes." 
Minus for BIAFRA; minus for NIGERIANS. 
(2) In coordinate clauses where the second clause has 
the same subject as the first, even with no pronoun 
standing for it 7 the symbol may be understood in the 
second clause. Example, "The NIGERIANS captured the 
city - and lost it again." Plus for the Nigerians 
and also a minus for the Nigerians. 
Rules for Small Contingencies in Coding 
(1) Tense: ·All statements are code.din terms of the effective 
present tense. All tenses in the data are first reduced to the effec-
tive presence if such relevancy can be established. In simple and 
(non-conditional) declarative sentences, each part thereof is to be 
, 
coded in terms of present tense. Example: "Nigeria won the first civil 
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war, but she might lose the next." Code: Nigeria+,-. 
(2) Mood: In sentences containing verb structure in the subjunc-
tive mQod, first try to reduce the conditional element to the effective 
present. Example: 
nation." Recasting: 
past time). Code: 
"If only BIAFRA had not lost, she would be a strong 
BIAFRA lost, did lose (an effective status quo in 
BIAFRA (will be) BIAFRA would be strong. Code: 
BIAFRA +. If future conditionals in the conditional element is pursely 
so, disregard the conditional and code in terms of the consequence. 
Example; · "If BIAFRA has enough ammunition, she will win the war." 
Recasting: Conditional element cannot be expressed as an effective 
present, so code the consequences (in terms of an effective present). 
Code: BIAFRA neutral, +. 
(J) Special Guides 
(a) Interrogatory sentences: In sentences wherein poor 
questioning is done, the sentence is codeable only in terms of 
neutral references. In compound interrogations, code that part 
of the item which can be reduced to effective present as in 11 2 11 
and all else neutral. Example: "Can BIAFRA win'?" Code: 
BIAFRA neutral. 
(b) Either-or sentences: Where both parts of an either-
or sentence represent pure condition, or pure contingency, 
code neutral. Example: "Either BIAFRA produces more ammuni-
tions or loses the war." Code: BIAFRA neutral. Where a 
consequence in terms of an effective present is explicit, code 
the consequences. Example: "Either we get more ammunitions or 
our territorial loss increases." Code: our territorial 
loss (BIAFRA), BIAFRA -. 
(c) Advice, suggestion: Outright sentences of advice are 
coded as neutral. Where a consequence is given which can be 
re-cast as an effective present, code the consequence. Example: 
11 BIAFRA should buy arms. 11 Code: Neutral. 
(d) Comparison: When both items in comparison predication 
are present, code each part in terms of effective present; also 
code the obvious conclusion for which the comparison was drawn. 
Example: 11 ];11.AFRA .lost men, Nigeria lost 5." Code: BIAFRA - , 
NIGERIA-, NIGERIA'S net+. 
(e) Verbs of contingency, condition, possibility: Must, 
should ought, may, believe, can, might, etc.· Example: "Under 
present conditions, NIGERIA must (has to) send her troops to 
·100 heartland." Where definite compulsive element is present, 
code the consequence then. NIGERIA is neutral, BI.AFRA +. 
(f) Irony, sarcasm, ridicule: Example, "NIGERIA is engaged 
in a slum clearance project in BI.AFRA. 11 Where the literal 
phrasing of such sentence manifestly indicates opposite meaning, 
negate the literal structure in coding. Thus, code minus 
morality for NIGERIA. 
(g) Sacrifice: Definition of sacrifice indicates an 
exchange of values. Where the one who male.es the sacrifice does 
so far a manifest purpose or cause (term of the exchange), code 
according to such manifest ends. Example: "NIGERIA sacrificed 
her youth to keep her honors. Sacrifice was for moral end. 11 
Therefore code +2 for NIGERIA and -1 for loss ·of her youth. 
(h) Belief 7 evaluation, opinion, hopes, wishes: Example: 
"OJUKWU believes (thinks, hopes, wishes) BI.AFRA will win. 11 
33 
(1) Claims, reports, rumors, indication: Example, 
GOWAN says BIAFRA is smashed. GOWAN claims victory. 
(2) Opinions which are not broached as editorial 
opinion: Example, GOWAN said NIGERIA used the wrong 
tactics. General rule: code the object of opinion, 
belief, report. Such belief is expressed by a codeable 
source - and not by unidentity and/or strictly news 
source. Code the source as neutral,· thus: GOWAN says 
BIAFRA is smashed - Gowan; BIAFRA -. 
(i) Dangers, fears, menaces, threats, all fears: All 
fears, menaces, ,or threats·are coded as deprivations. 
(j) Attacks and retreats (successful or not): General 
rule: Code attacks only where there is an indication of 
success or failure; never mention of +S column under symbol: 
of the classification of the predication is -S according to 
strength, code number of the symbol is written in the -S 
column under symbol; etc. 
In the further interest of clarity, supplementary instructions may 
21 be issued regrading standards, and are as follows: 
I. STRENGTH: Plus 
Gain of, act, indication, promise, hope, expectation, demands 
of: economic, military, diplomatic, social strength and/or gain. 
Military strength: attack, raids on, bombing of, harassing of 
the enemy; avoidance of losses, availability of fighting power, 
personnel, and material; military operations "successfully" 
21 P• 13 • Lasswell, "The Politically Significance Content of the Press," 
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carried out - such as reconnaissance, improved position, scouting 
parties, etc. Economic strength: aid received or promised, trade 
pacts, negotiations, production gains, finance available, avail-
abi}ity of materials, resources, transportation, communication 
facilities. Diplomatic strength: envoy recall, demands for 
reparations, verbal attacks,and offensives, belligerent stands, 
pro-war and anti-peace stands, threats. Ideological strength: 
social services available, child care, health standards, medical 
facilities, education despite adverse conditions, housing and 
shelter facilities. 
II. WEAKNESS: Minus 
Loss of,~act, indication, expectancy of weakness or defeat 
in the military, economic, diplomatic, or social spheres. 
Military loss: attacks suffered, casualties, loss of position, 
material; failures of attacks, raids, sorties, reconnaissance, 
insufficiencies of fighting power, retreat; military gains as 
described above when the symbol on which gains have been made 
is indicated. Economic weakness: lack of items constituting 
economic strengths described above; need for aid, shortages. 
Diplomatic weakness: yielding to pressure, conciliatory 
attitudes, pro-peace anti-war in face of threats! Ideological 
weakness: lack of items listed under ideological strength. 
III. MORALITY: Plus 
Emotional evaluations of the symbol, endowing it with the 
following qualities: truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, 
propriety, religiosity, honor, generosity, kindness, affection, 
sympathy, duty, justice, honesty, patriotism, loyalty, 
legality (courage, bravery). 
IV. IMMORfALITY: Minus 
Emotional evaluation of the symbol, endowing it with the 
following: falsity, viciousness, ferocity, uncharitableness, 
cowardice, impropriety, pagfnism, dishonor 1 selfishness, cruelty, 
hatred, vanity, treachery, treason, subversiveness, unjust, 
dishonesty, unpatriotism, disloyalty, illegality, aggressions, 
insanities, abnormalities. 
Classification Procedures 
This was adapted also from the work of Lasswell et al., with 
some changes. 
(1) The medium studied here was Time magazine. The dates -
Julys 1967 to January, 1970., The pages - The World section where 
there were stories on the Nigerian Civil War. 
(2) A form schedule for analysis of every period of phase of 
the war, see Appendix A. 
(a) Date of article being studied and the period of 
war in the spaces at the top of the schedule. 
(b) All the symbols were memorized. 
(c) Magazines were read for symbols in the code. When 
a symbol was found 9 it was then coded, its predica-
tion was determined and classified according to 
"indulgence-deprivation" and standard. 
(d) If the classification of the predication was+ 
according to strength, the symbol was coded in the 
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+S column under symbol; if the predication was -S 
according to the strength, code number of the symbol 
was written in the -S column under the symbol; etc. 
(3) The coded sheets were then tabulated and the frequencies of 
each symbol in the code sheet was tabulated by a simple counting 
operation. 
The research question guiding this study is based in the main on 
the frequency counts of favorable and unfavorable presentations of 
symbols in relationship to the main participants in the civil war. 
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Also, we are interested in the plus and minus character of presen-
tation. While the former enabled us to predict direction of symbol 
predication the latter gave us the dimension of symbol predication. 
The following statistics were applied to propositions 1-3· 
Proposition 1. A percentile table showing the following: 
(a) Negative presentation of the Federal government and 
the Rebel government. 
(b) Positive presentation of the Rebel government and 
the Federal government. 
Proposition 2. Complex chi square and contingency coefficient 
were comput,ed to determine the significance of relationship and the 
degree of relationship between: 
(a) Unfavorable symbol presentation of the Federal 
government and the Rebel government. 
(b) Favorable symbol presentation of Rebel government 
and the Federal government. 
Proposition 3. Percentile table would be computed for certain 
variables depicting the issue at stake during the conflict and the 
individuals on both sides to determine relationship of emphasis on the 
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DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TIME ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR 
Federal Government Rebel Government 
+ 0 + 0 
s M s. M s M s 
5.2 6.7 1.5 16.3 13.3 20.0 11.9 3.0 11.1 29.6 31.9 17.8 3.0 
6.6 2.5 o.8 17.9 10.3 32.9 5.1 
9.1 6. 4 18. 7 Li,3 .2 16.0 6.7 
6.o 3.9 6.0 13.3 10.2 27.4 6.3 
9.9 9.1 19.3 37.6 17.2 7.0 
4.o 6.7 16.1 11.4 16.1 23.5 0.7 
10.7 7.4 27.5 37.6 14.1 .7 
7.1 13 .o lie. 6 6.4 8.4 21.8 10.5 
20.1 8.8 10.9 30.2 16.8 13.0 
Positive Strength +M Positive Morality 
Neutral -M Negative Morality 














disproportionately negative to the rebels. This was in complete con-
trast to the situation on the battle field as shown on page ~O {see 
Table I). 
Take the first phase of the civil war, for example (July 1967-
August 1967). · .The Federal government embarked on a "police action" 
against Biafra. And in retaliation, the Briafrari forces invaded the 
Mid-West region of Nigeria. This fact, at least, should have shown 
either side as even in terms of strength (military strength: attack, 
raids on, harassing enemy, etc.). 
Also, the emotional evaluation of the symbols should have endowed 
them with the fallowing qualities equally: propriety, duty, justice, 
patriotism, legality (courage and bravery, Morality-plus) in the same 
proportion or near to it. Instead, Time, in its coverage, portrayed the 
Federal government 5.2 percent in terms of Positive strength and the 
r.ebels 20 ... 0 percent. As for Morality-plus (propriety, duty, justice, 
patriotism, legality), this writer found the rebels with 11.9 percent, 
while the Federal government was given only 1.5 percent. One conclusion 
is that Time magazine passed a clearcut judgment from the beginning of 
the conflict as to which side was right and which was wrong. For 
instanl'.:~ one of its correspondents wrote on July 1~, 1967: 
Colonel Ojukwu called on the Biafrans to kill ten Federal 
soldiers for every one of their Ibo tribesmen slaughtered 
last year in riots in the predominantly Moslem North. It 
was the massacres of thousands of Ibos that convinced 
Ojukwu that his state cannot hope to live safely within a 
strong Federal union led by Gowon and Northern Officers. 
Ojukwu's troops had taken up positions at the oil 
installations, and the companies apparently felt that they 
had no choice but to pay the de facto government. This 
gave the Eastern regime a degree of recognition, and may 
have convinced Gowan that the time had come to demonstrate 
that he could enforce his writ throughout Nigeria. 1 
The first paragraph endowed the symbol Ojukwu (Biafra), with emo-
tional evaluations (Morality-plus): heroism, virtue, propriety, honor, 
duty, justice, patriotism and legality (courage, bravery). The second 
paragraph portrayed it in term of strength-plus-gain of hope, expecta-
tion, demands of: economic, military, diplomatic, social strength 
and/or gain. 
Pha~e II and III (August, 1967 -
April, 1969) 
By now the civil war was in full scale. The rebels had lost their 
capital Enugun and some of their big cities - Onitsha, Calbar and Port 
Hacourt. One would expect the percentage of the Strength-plus dimension 
to be disproportionately high in favor of the Federal government. 
Instead, the figures are Federal government, 6.6 percent, and the 
rebels, 10.J percent. And the Morality-plus dimension shows the Fed-
eral government as 2.5 percent (an increase of 1 percent for the Federal 
government, and 21.0 percent for the rebels) as shown in Table I. Thus, 
Time implied it saw the position of the rebels as proper, just, pat-
riotic and legal. The Timevs correspondent wrote: 
There were thus ample signs that the war may prove to be a 
long one, though the 'battles' so far have been rather 
modest skirmishes. The Federals, their lines overextended 
in places, were tending· to stick to the roads, while the 




19. (July 1~, 1967), P• 
(July 28, 1967), p. 29. 
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By this report, Time endowed the Federal government with more 
Morality-minus. It gave it the emotional evaluation of cowardice and 
aggression. While at the same time, coverage portrayed the rebels more 
in the Strength-plus dimension by showing them to have military 
strength: attack, raids on, harrassing of the 11 enemy, 11 avoidance of 
losses, availability of fighting power, and improved position. 
Although,the third phase of the war could be said to be indecisive. 
This is because the two sides were taking what could be regarded as a 
show-of-strength position. Biafrans mounted their counter offensive, 
and the Nigerian Air Force escalated their air raid on the enemy terri-
tory. But the data show the Federal government with a decrease of .6 
p~rcent and the rebels .1 percent (6.0 percent to 6.3 percent). 
Quantitatively, the difference in the portrayal of the two sides 
was negligible. Yet during these particular phases (II and III), one of 
the Time correspondence still wrote the following: 
Ojukwu ••• having fought his attackers to a standstill, 
he was ready to take the off~nsive. In a swift twelve-hour 
drive, he captured the federal government's oil-rich Mid-
western State ••• with impresssive ease •••• With nice 
timing, Biafra sympathizers in Benin were already staging a 
military coup. So far, Gowan 1 s 15,000 troops double those of 
Ojukwu - have barely won a foothold in Biafra •••• It is 
still anybody's war.3 
Again, another Time correspondent wrote this about the rebels: 
"The 8,500,000 Ibo tribesmen in the secessionist state of Biafra are 
proving adept at the business of defending their homeland as they have 
always been at trade and commerce." 4 
These are just a few of such statements that portrayed the rebels 
3Time (August 18, 1967) 1 p. 29. 
4T. ime (February 9, 1968), p. J8. 
in good light and the Federal government as the culprit. 
As these statements show, it was ~'s tendency to give entirely 
false information about the war in an attempt to present the rebels in 
more Strength-plus than the Federal government. These provide answers 
to the question raised in Proposition 1 as to what proportion of ~'s 
coverage was positive to the Federal government, and disproportionately 
positive to the rebels. 
Phase IV (April,, 1969 .,. November, 1969) 
During this phase, the rebels had lost their big cities and all 
their major airports and were restricted to an area of some 4,000 square 
miles of the 29,000 square miles they held when hostilities began (see 
Figure 5). 
In contrast, Table I, page ~o, shows that the rebels were presented 
more favorable in terms of Strength dimension than the Federal govern-
ment. The rebels actually gained 5.9 percent while the Federal govern-
ment lost 2.0 percent (4.0 percent to 6.1 percent). As for the 
Morality dimension, the Federal government gained 2.8 percent while the 
rebels lost 3.9 percent (6 .• 7 percent to 23.5 percent). One conclusion 
that could be reached is that as the civil war dragged on, Time's cover-
age began to see it as proper, just, patriotic and legal, as far as the 
Federal government was concerned. And Time portrayed the rebels still 
higher in the Morality dimension. 
An example of presentation of the rebels in terms of Strength by 
Time was when one of its correspondents, James Wilde, wrote the 
following: 
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SOURCE: Genenka Zedenek, The Nigerian War, 1972, 
p. 72. 
Figure 5. A Map of Biafra Showing the Area Under 
the Rebels' Control During Phase IV 
There was the. unmistakable whistle of a 105-gun howitzer •• 
The gun fired six rounds, and the Nigerian lines began 
to crumble. 
The Biafran troops fighting on despite the loss 
of capitals. Soon after Umuahia fell in April, Biafra re-
taliated by capturing the junction town of Owerri following 
a lengthy siege. Last week Biafran units were moving slowly 
southward from Owerri toward the oil field around Port 
Harcourt.5 
According to the Strength-plus dimension, the above paragraph 
showed the rebels as gain-of, hope, expectation. In terms of military 
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strength, it showe~ them on the attack: raids on, harassing the enemy, 
availability of fighting power; military operations "successfully" 
carried out, 15..mproved position." 
With a solid presentation of the rebels in Morality-plus (23.5 per-
cent to 6.7 percent for the Federal) in the Phase IV of the war, little 
would one wonder when~ wrote the following about the rebels: 
To the east, where they are now trapped, the ambitious and 
clever Ibo people thrived. Most hated of all and 
most envied by other Nigerians-were the Ibos, quite possibly 
Africa's most capable people and by force of energy and 
intellect, the dominant tribe of newly independent Nigeria. 6 
Not only did the Time write in glowing terms about the rebels, 
reporting the illegal arrest of some foreign oilmen by the rebel 
soldiers its correspondent wrote: 
Biafran tribunal that sits for security cases condemned the 
18 prisoners to death by firing squad for helping Nigeria 
wage war •••• Ojukwu treated the men correctly however. 
Three lawyers defended them at their trial, they received 
food forwarded by the Vatican •••• He got his way when 
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mario Pedini flew into 
Owerri to negotiate, thus giving Biafra at least temporary 
defacto recognition that irritated opposing Nigeria.7 
5Time (June 13, 1968), p. 44. 
6T. 1me 
7T. 1me 
(August.23, 1968), p. 21. 
(June 13, 1969), P• 49. 
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Again, this is how one Time correspondent, Alan Grossman, reported 
a Federal air raid from Umuahia: 
Nigerian jets returning to their bases have even doubled 
back to strafe civilian crowds gathered at railway crossings, 
in village marketplaces and in a churchyard after morning 
services. Nigeria's Egyptian pilots have so often bombed 
and strafed Biafran hospit~ls whose roofs are often clearly 
marked with large crosses. 
One needs no further explanation apart from the afore-mentioned 
paragraphs that 1!.!!!!'s coverage of the Nigerian Civil War portrayed the 
rebels more in the dimension of Morality-plus. The above paragraphs 
are an emotional evaluation of the symbol-Biafra - endowing it with 
the following qualities: truth, glory, virtue, propriety, honor, 
SYlllpathy, duty, justice, honesty, patriotism. 
Contrary to the situation on the battle field as demonstrated by 
the present phase of the war (the fall of the rebels' new capital -
Umuahia), Time portrayed the rebels higher in terms of Strength-plus 
(military strength) than the Federal government (4:.0 percent to 16.1 
percent). This is far from what may be called an 11 objective 11 reporting. 
Phase V (November, 1969 - January, 1970) 
The final phase of the civil war, won by the Federal government, 
did not alter the perception of the Federal role by Time. At least now 
one would expect Time to portray the winner overwhelmingly positive in 
the dimension Strength. Instead, the Federal government was given 7.1 
percent portrayalih.positive Strength, and the rebels 8.4: percent in 
'· 
the same dimension. 
Also, the positive-Morality portrayal of the Federal government was 
8T. ime (May 10, 1968), P• 4:5. 
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Fav. Unfav. Fav. Unfav. x2 df c Significance 
. 
1 9.0 4:o.o 4:3.0 4:. 4: 4:3 • .7.627 1 .9804: p <· .Q1 
··~ .. :''."·~' . 
. .. · 
2 4:4:. 0 91.0 210.0- 33.0 111.64:32 1 .9852 p < .001 
,3 28.0 55.0 107.0 20.0 '53 .614:6 1 .9654: p< .01 
4: 1G.o 4:1.0 59.0 1.0 59.6966 1 .984:0 p< .01 
5 4:8 .. o 26.0 72.0 31.0 .2965 1 .0223 > NS 
/ 
',,., 
*Favorable and Unfavorable presentation of Federal and Biafran 
governments by~ magazine during each of five phases of Nigerian 




In Table II, page ~9, the figures for Favorable were compiled from 
the presentations of the parties in Positive light(+); and those for 
Unfavorable from their presentations in Negative light(-). A quick 
look at the table suggests there is a clear-cut direction in ~'s 
coverage of the parties during the Civil War. 
This proposition is supported significantly in four of the five 
phases~ This is supported by expected fr~quency test showing strong 
conteinge~cy coefficients (C) of magnitud~ of re~ations. 
In Phase I of the war, figures for the rebels are ~3 to~-~ for the 
. 
Federal government in Favorable direction as shown in Table II. With 
~8.7620, one can conclude that the difference is significant. The 
observed differences could occur less than 1 time in 100. The coeffi-
cient of contingency of .98_0~ shows a strong relat~onship. Ther,efore, 
in the first phase of the war, the Time's coverage of the war supports 
the propos.i tion. 
The difference in the second phase also supports ~he proposition.· 
., 
The observed difference ratio of 111.6~32 could occur by; chance less 
than 1 time in 100. And the coefficient of contingency ( .9852) shows 
a strong relationship. It is also noteworthy that despite the reverses 
occurring on the battlefield by the rebels during this phase (full-scale 
military opera~ion against Biafra. fall of Enugun, Onitsha, Calarbar 
and Port Haz:court), Time magazine still portrays them in more favorable 
light than it did the Federal government. 
The same trend continues in Phase III and Phase IV with difference 
ratios of 53.61~, 59.6966, all significant at .01 level, and correla-
tions of .9654 and .98~0. 
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Only in Phase V of the war was there a non-significant difference 
between the portrayal of the Federal government in unfavorable light and 
the portrayal of the rebels in favorable light. Even then, the Federal 
government was given ~8 favorable rating and the rebels' 72. These 
figures also answer the question as to which of the two participants 
Time portrayed in more unfavorable light than favorable. 
Individual phases of the war apart, what about the over-all direc-
tion'? This question is answered by the interaction of the cells in 
Table III. Of the total 210 assertions, 135 were favorable; 75 unfav-
arable. Biafra received more favorable, while the Federal government 
received more unfavorable. Were the diffennces among the cells, as 
shown in Table II,. greater than would be expected by chance'? The 
observed difference ratio was significant at the .01 level. The differ-
ence ratio of 53.61~6 could occur by chance less than 1 time in 100. 
Therefore, Time magazine's coverage of the Nigerian Civil War did 
probably portray the Biafra government in more favorable light while 
it portrayed the Federal government in unfavorable light. 
Then what about the relationship between the portrayal of the 
Federal government in unfavorable l1ght and the Biafra government in 
more favorable light'? The coefficient of contingency was 0.965~ which 
gave a rough estimate of correlation between each government and the 
direction in which it was presented. It is overwhelmingly significant. 
Presentation of Individuals and Issues 
Table IV reports on the third proposition: How accurate was the 
I 
Time's coverage of the war with regard to the aspect of the war empha-
sized in its coverage? 
TABLE III 
NUMBERS OF TIMES ALL THE 50 KEY VARIABLES WERE USED 
IN FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE LIGHTS TOWARD 
THE TWO GOVERNMENTS 
Governments 
Federal Biafra Total 
1:: I 135 75 
Favorable 28 
Unfavorable 55 
83 127 210 
··-.,i 
Chi Square= 53.6146 (p < .01) 









PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SYMBOLS ATTRIBUTED 
BY TIME TO INDIVIDUALS AND ISSUES OF THE NIGERIAN 
~IVIL WAR (MAY 1967 TO JANUARY 1970) 
Individuals and Issues 
United 
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Gowan Ojukwu. Nigeria Biafra Secession 
+ + + + + 
1.3% 37.7% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.2% 3.5% 1.5% 0.0% 
9.9 11.2 15.3 20.7 o.6 o.o 37.9 22.5 o.o o.6 
2.8 o.6 4.3 1.4 o.o o.o 17.4 12.11 2.2 o.o 
1.5 4.3 6.8 o.o o.o o.o 17.0 1.4 o.o o.o 
24.6 10.4 5.8 33.2 o.o o.o 13.6 13. 7 o.o o.o 
In order to clarify the answer to this proposition, the presenta-
tion of each symbol was restricted to the two directions: positive and 
negative, divided into the five phases of the war. The decision has 
been taken arbitrarily to compare all the symbols according to their 
over~all presentation throughout the war and not during the individual 
phase of the war. 
A quick look at the data presented in Table IV shows that~ made 
more references to the symbols representing the names of individuals 
(the names of the leaders of both parties involved in the conflict: 
Gowan, the Federal leader, and Ojukwu, the rebel leader), as well as the 
symbol Biafra than the issues-United Nigeria and Secession. 
While the symbols Gowan, Ojukwu, and Biafra had references ranging 
between 1.3 percent and 37.9 percent, the two issues involved in the 
conflict constitute as low as 0.6 percent (United Nigeria) in Phase II 
and the highest of 2.2 percent (Secession) in Phase III. And the only 
other presentation of either issues was to Secession 1.5 percent in 
Phase I, see Table IV. 
Therefore, the conclusion could be reached that Time paid more 
attention to the symbols representing the individual leader of the con-
flict than it did to the issues. The heavy reference to Biafra could be 
construed as an implication of associating the name Ojukwu with Biafra. 
As to the issue United Nigeria,~ did not think it was the cause or 
even an indirect cause of the war. 
If Time's treatment of the symbol United Nigeria has any signifi-
cance, it is that not only did Time not consider it as an issue during 
the conflict, but there is nothing by that name. This conclusion is 
supported by what one of its correspondents wrote during the conflict: 
"Unfortunately, Nigeria is only partly a nation; it is, in fact, an 
arbitrary conglomeration of hostile tribes. 119 
9T. 1me (May 18, 1968), P• 31. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCUJSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
This study 1 s findings indicate bias in Time's coverage of the 
Nigerian Civil War in favor of Biafra. This contention, the writer 
would like to caution, is based on what information the coverage pro-
vided by Time. And as determined by the stated rules of interpretation 
of press content. 
Time I s coverage was very pro-Biafra in terms of direction and dimen-
sion during most of the war. It was not until when the war was moving 
toward its end 1 and the final outcome was clear (that the rebellion was 
doomed), did Time shift its position and increase the positive portrayal 
of the Federal government (from 6.7 perceµt to 20.1 percent). This 
should be expected, in that no one likes to be associated with a fail-
course. Another evidence of the shift in the position of Time is the non-
significant differend~s reported during Phase Vof the civil war, Table 11, 
The same support for the rebellion was demonstrated in Time's 
treatment of the specific symbols. The symbols related to the Federal 
government received more negative presentations than those associated 
with the rebels. Take the symbol Gowan (Table IV). It was portrayed 
in more negative light than positive. Not until the last phase of the 
civil war was this symbol referred to in more positive light than 
negative (+1.J percent to -13.7 percent in the first phase, and +2~.6 
56 
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percen to -10.4 percent in the fifth phase). Maybe identification with 
the winning side is also the reason for this change. 
It is noteworthy that the symbol Ojuk.wu (the name of the rebels' 
leader), was treated in the opposite direction from that of the symbol 
Gowan. That is, it received more positive mention at the beginning of 
the conflict and more negative mention at the end. The same reason 
would suffice here. 
From the way the symbol United Nigeria was treated (see Table IV), 
the highest mention of .6 percent implies that Time's coverage did not 
reflect this symbol as an important cause of the war. This was a dis-
tortion of the actual situation. Everyone who had followed the trend 
of events in Nigeria pertaining to the war knows there was a breakaway 
of some of its (Nigeria) constituency, part which was later named 
Biafra. 
As a matter of fact, this was the main cause of the conflict. 
But Time, for reasons unknown to the writer, apparently did not think 
so. Why? The writer has no answer and would not attempt to provide 
one. 
Noting the number of mentions Time gave the symbol Secession, it 
would be very qifficult for a reader to discern this as an issue in the 
conflict. Whereas, anyone familiar with the situation knew there was a 
secession. And this led to the civil war. 
From the data irt Table IV, it is clear that Time treated the symbol 
"Secession" more positively.than negatively (+2.2 percent the highest 
and -.6 percent the highest negative). It should be pointed out that 
in Phases IV and V, there was no reference to this symbol. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
The present study has demonsrated the value of using the content 
of communication to determine the direction and dimension of communica-
tion quantitatively. Whatever may be the shortcomings of this study, 
and they are many, it has definitely opened up an old field of communi-
cation research - content analysis. 
The exploratory and limited' scope of this study could not have 
covered every aspect of the Time's coverage of the Nigerian Civil War. 
Thus, the reported results are merely speculative. 
The writer would like to point out some shortcomings of the study. 
The first of which is the writer's prejudice in the civil war, being a 
Nigerian from the Western region of the federation. His people were at 
the forefront of the civil war. They fought on the side of the Federal 
government. As such, his sentiment was for the Federal government 
during the conflict. How much this must have influenced some of his 
interpretations of the.content of the Timevs coverage would be hard, if 
not impossible, to determine. 
There were some sets of ground rules for interpretation which were 
aimed at achieving objectivity. How far this was achieved could be 
easily judged by the readers of this study. 
Next is the methodology of the study: The shortcoming here is in 
the coding of symbols. This was done by the writer solely. There was 
no built-in technique for checking the coding consistency. By the 
nature of the materials involved in the study, some value judgments had 
to be made. 
Due to the lack of finance and time, it was not possible to recruit 
outside coders to recode the symbols, so that interceder reliability 
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could be determined. This, the writer believes, would add to the 
credibility of the findings. 
However, it would be interesting to see how much difference there 
would be in the findings of future researchers from that of the 
writer's, using exactly the same methodology and the same data. One can 
take solace in the level of the significant findings and hope there 
would be little difference in their findings and that of the writer's. 
In conclusion, the writer has observed a tendency to treat the 
tC:,=-~;-,p? 
c~=:~o;e fairly than the Federal government in the ~'s coverage of 
the civil war. The three propositions have been supported. There were 
significant differences in the portrayal of the Federal government in 
more negative light and the rebels in more positive lights. 
There were significant differences in the portrayal of the Federal 
government in unfavorable light and the rebels in favorable lights. 
The percentages of positive mention of personality (the leader and the 
symbol Biafra) on the rebels 9 side were higher than that of the Federal 
government and more attention was paid to these personalities than the 
symbols representing the issues (United Nigeria and Secession). 
The writer had given some reasons for the performance of the Time 
magazine, but these are not supported by any evidence. One is then 
tempted to conclude that Time may be playing an old game of rooting for 
the underdog. It was obvious in the conflict examined, the rebels 
were the underdog. 
From the way the correspondents of Time magazine had covered the 
Nigerian Civil War, they demonstrated a great lack of knowledge of the 
local issues involved. As such, the writer would recommend that in 
reporting on any future international conflict, Time management should 
make U$e of local journalists who would be able to give adequate back-
ground of the event in question. The age of the instant expert is 
gone, and it is time this fact is recognized for the good of all. 
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Finally, the writer would like to suggest that Time magazine and 
any other·media that has interest in foreign countries should practice 
their "objective" reporting in those countries as they do at home. This 
is another lesson the press of those countries would learn from them. 
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